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From the Legal Literature
Francesca Laguardia*
AUTOMATING POLICE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The movement to defund police has gained new momentum in the
wakes of the killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor.1 While
some activists focus only on reducing funding for and corresponding
uses of police forces,2 others suggest fully abolishing police and
building something entirely new.3 At a minimum, however, the movement calls for a reduction in spending on police departments, investment in social programs and resources that reduce crime, reducing
the role of police and replacing them (in many situations) with social
workers and community involvement, and reducing spending on
military equipment for police forces.4
Opposition to this call tends to focus on the risk of increased
crime if police budgets are cut and there are fewer police on the
street.5 Police officers and others argue that increased police presence is responsible for decreases in crime rates, which will reverse
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New York University’s Institute for Law and Society.
1

E.g., Rashawn Ray, What Does ‘Defund the Police’ Mean and Does It Have
Merit? BROOKINGS (June 19, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/
19/what-does-defund-the-police-mean-and-does-it-have-merit/; Patrick Sharkey,
Why Do We Need the Police?, WASH. POST (June 12, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/outlook/2020/06/12/defund-police-violent-crime; Taylor Miller Thomas &
Beatrice Jin, As U.S. Crime Rates Dropped, Local Police Spending https://www.poli
tico.com/interactives/2020/police-budget-spending-george-floyd-defund/.
2

E.g., Ray, supra note 1; Zachary Siegel, ‘Starve the Beast’: A Q&A With Alex
S. Vitale on Defunding the Police, NATION (June 4, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/
article/society/alex-vitale-defund-police-interview/.
3

Ruairi Arrieta-Kenna, The Deep Roots—and New Offshoots—of ‘Abolish the
Police’ POLITICO (June 12, 202, 7:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/
2020/06/12/abolish-defund-police-explainer-316185; Sean Illing, The “Abolish the
Police” Movement, Explained By 7 Scholars and Activists, VOX (June 12, 2020,
11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/6/12/21283813/george-floy
d-blm-abolish-the-police-8cantwait-minneapolis; Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean
Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolish-defund-police.html.
4

E.g., Ray, supra note 1; Sharkey, supra note 1; Siegel, supra note 2.

5

E.g., Sharkey, supra note 1.
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if police departments are defunded.6 There has been a consistent
stream of research supporting this idea,7 although the issue is far
from settled.8
But even if it is true that police presence deters crime, there
remains the question of whether it must be police that are present,
as opposed to community representatives, cameras, or other forms
of technology. The impact of increased police officers appears to be
a deterrent effect associated with increased certainty of arrest.9 This
suggests that automated measures—such as surveillance cameras,
red light cameras, and other digital policing methods—may lessen
6

E.g., Joshua Rosario, Jersey City Officials Balk at Concept of Defunding the
Police, THE JERSEY J. (June 9, 2020), https://www.nj.com/hudson/2020/06/as-calls-todefund-police-departments-ramp-up-jersey-city-officials.html (quoting Jersey City
Mayor Steve Fulop, “I would highlight the fact that we have seen historic decreases
in crime because we invested in young officers that live in the community and
reflect the diversity of the community”); Wall St. J. Ed. Bd., Defund Police, Watch
Crime Return, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/defund-polic
e-watch-crime-return-11591658454.
7

DON STEMEN, RECONSIDERING INCARCERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR REDUCING CRIME 10
(2007) (summarizing literature); Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police
Hiring to Estimate the Effects of Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270 (1997)
(finding a 10% increase in the size of a city’s police force resulted in an 11% reduction in violent crime and a 3% reduction in property crime); Thomas Marvel &
Carlisle Moody, Specification Problems, Police Levels, and Crime Rates, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 609 (1996) (finding a 10% increase in the size of a city’s police force resulted in
a 3% reduction in index crime rates); Steven Mello, More Cops Less Crime 172 J.
OF PUB. ECON. 174 (2019) (finding “[e]ach additional police officer prevented 4 violent
crimes and 15 property crimes”); Jihong Solomon Zhao, Matthew C. Scheider &
Quint Thurman. Funding Community Policing to Reduce Crime: Have COPS Grants
Made a Difference?, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 7 (2002–2003) (finding that each
dollar in hiring grants resulted in a reduction of more than five violent crimes and
twenty-one property crimes per 100,000 residents).
8

E.g., John Eck & Edward Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced
Violent Crime?: An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207
(Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000); JUST. POL’Y INST., RETHINKING THE BLUES:
HOW WE POLICE IN THE U.S. AND AT WHAT COST 16–20 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.or
g/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/rethinkingtheblues_final.pdf (noting that crime
declines often began prior to funding increases, that several studies that have found
no association between grants and crime reduction, and that states with smaller
police budgets do not necessarily have less crime) [hereinafter “JPI, RETHINKING”;
John Worrall & Tomislav V. Kovandzic, COPS Grants and Crime Revisited, 45
CRIMINOLOGY 159 (2007) (reanalyzing prior data to find that grants had no effect on
crime rates); see also Anthony A. Braga, Crime and Policing Revisited, NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING BULL. (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Gov’t & Nat’l Inst. Just.), Sept. 2015, at
9, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248888.pdf.
9

Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know about Criminal Deterrence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 789–94 (2010).
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the need for police interaction; indeed, calls to replace police presence with digital substitutes have been appearing for several years.10
In the renewed push to decrease the number of social functions
performed by police (in order to limit police interactions that might
turn violent), the question of automating policing intensifies. In June,
for example, the Los Angeles City Council heard a proposal to
automate traffic enforcement in order to reduce unnecessary (and
often biased) interactions between police and the public.11 Additionally, proponents for defunding police regularly point to Camden, New
Jersey, as a model for the positive results that severe limiting of
police functions can have.12 Notably, Camden’s policing innovations
largely relied on automating police functions.13
But the size of the digital surveillance apparatus created to reduce
interactions with police in Camden has led to criticisms and resent10

E.g., Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 959 (2012–2013); Nancy G. La Vigne, Samantha S. Lowry, Joshua A.
Markman, & Allison M. Dwyer, Evaluating the Use of Public Surveillance Cameras
for Crime Control and Prevention—A Summary, JUST. POL’S CTR. BRIEF (Urban Inst.),
Sept. 2011, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/27546/412401-Evalu
ating-the-Use-of-Public-Surveillance-Cameras-for-Crime-Control-and-Prevention-ASummary.PDF; see also Conor Friedersdorf, End Needless Interactions With Police
Officers During Traffic Stops, ATLANTIC (July 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/po
litics/archive/2016/07/end-needless-interaction-with-cops-during-traffic-stops/
490412/.
11

David Graham-Caso, Los Angeles Council Tackles “Driving While Black,”
SANTA MONICA DAILY PRESS (Jul. 04, 2020), https://www.smdp.com/los-angeles-counciltackles-driving-while-black/193824; Indeed, the Chief of Police for Lansing,
Michigan, recently sent out an internal memo stating that police officers should not
stop drivers for “regulatory violations such as, cracked windshields, loud exhaust,
inoperable license plate lamp, cracked taillights, dangling ornaments, and window
treatments” in an attempt to “eliminat[e] any aspect, inferred or otherwise, of biasbased traffic policing practices.” Memorandum from Chief of Police Daryl Green on
New Guidelines for Traffic Stops 1 (July 1 2020), https://www.lansingmi.gov/Docum
entCenter/View/10271/New-Traffic-Stop-Guidelines-.
12

E.g., Chris Megerian, Disband the Police? Camden Already Did That, L.A.
TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-06-10/disband-th
e-police-camden-already-did-that; James Doubek, Former Chief of Reformed
Camden, N.J., Force: Police Need ‘Consent of the People’, NPR.ORG (June 8, 2020,
7:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/
06/08/872416644/former-chief-of-reformed-camden-n-j-force-police-need-consent-o
f-the-people; Khaleda Rahman, Minneapolis Is Not the First City to Disband Its
Police Department—the Lessons Learned From Camden, New Jersey, NEWSWEEK
(June 8, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/minneapolis-not-first-disband-police-de
partment-1509327; Ray, supra note 1.
13

Brendan McQuade, The “Camden Model” Is Not a Model. It’s an Obstacle to
Real Change. JACOBIN MAG. (July 4, 2020), https://jacobinmag.com/2020/07/camdennew-jersey-police-reform-surveillance [hereinafter “McQuade, JACOBIN”]; Brendan
McQuade, The Camden Police Department Is Not a Model for Policing in the
Post-George Floyd Era, THE APPEAL (June 12, 2020), https://theappeal.org/camden-p
olice-george-floyd/ [hereinafter “McQuade, THE APPEAL”].
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ment from residents.14 The digital developments Camden relied on
included “121 cameras that monitor the entire city; 35 ShotSpotter
microphones to detect gunshots; automated scanners that read
license plates; and SkyPatrol, a mobile observation post that can
scan six square blocks with thermal-imaging equipment.”15 Critics
suggest that such developments lead to residents feeling “they are
more ‘watched’ than protected by the police,” and that an inability to
fight automated tickets and other sanctions undermines residents’
feeling that the system is fair or legitimate.16
In this manner, digital policing methods subtly but ominously hang
over the debate on defunding police and reducing their physical
presence in communities. As in all industries, automation is a popular
method by which to respond to budget deficits (as might exist if
police are defunded).17 The simultaneous push to reduce funding
and reduce police contact easily lends itself to increases in digital
policing methods, as well as the criticisms attendant to them such as
those now present in Camden. Yet, despite the increasing prevalence
and intensity of automation in modern policing, and despite its hovering like a sword of Damocles over the head of the defunding debate,
the implications of automating policing have received relatively little
attention.18
Elizabeth Joh, Professor at U.C. Davis School of Law, has stepped
in to begin closing this gap.19 In her article, The Consequences of
Automating and Deskilling the Police, she highlights the seep of
automation into policing and some of the ramifications of that
progress.20 She primarily focuses on the ramifications to police of14

JPI, RETHINKING, supra note 8, at 30–32; McQuade, JACOBIN, supra note 13;
McQuade, THE APPEAL, supra note 13; Megerian, supra note 11.
15

McQuade, THE APPEAL, supra note 13.

16

JPI, RETHINKING, supra note 8, at 30, 32.

17

Elizabeth Joh, The Consequences of Automating and Deskilling the Police,
67 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 133, 156 (2019) (“Technological solutions have looked
increasingly more attractive as ‘force multipliers’ to police administrators faced with
layoffs and cutbacks.”).
18

But see Elizabeth Joh, Automated Seizures: Police Stops of Self-Driving
Cars, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 113 (2019); Elizabeth Joh, Automated Policing, 15
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559 (2018). See also ANDREW G. FERGUSEN, THE RISE OF BIG DATA
POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2018); Richard
Silberglitt, et al., VISIONS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY IN THE PERIOD 2024–2034:
REPORT OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT FUTURING WORKSHOP (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdff
iles1/nij/grants/248718.pdf; Nicky Woolf, RoboCop Is Real — and Could Be Patrolling a Mall Near You, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-ne
ws/2016/may/20/robocop-robot-mall-security-guard-palo-alto-california.
19

Joh, supra note 17.

20

Joh, supra note 17, at 140–46.
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ficers’ skill sets,21 as well as the implications for the deference police
officers receive in criminal procedure doctrine.22 She only briefly
touches on the implications of changing the social relationship
between police and communities.23 Written well before the murder of
George Floyd and the protests that ensued, Joh’s description of
these changes is almost wholly negative. In the current context
readers must ask—are there also positive aspects to these changes
that have been ignored up until this point?
II. ELIZABETH JOH, THE CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMATING AND DESKILLING THE
POLICE, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 133 (2019).
Joh begins by clarifying and highlighting the areas in which policing is likely to be replaced by automation.24 As she points out,
most police patrol is . . . trivial, noncriminal, and boring. The average
police officer rarely fires his gun. Arrests are infrequent. [Most police
work involves] directing traffic, responding to accidents, resolving
disputes with non-legal methods, addressing matters of homelessness
and mental illness, and sometimes just driving around.25

These tasks lend themselves to automation through options such
as automatic license plate readers and even robot security guards
which currently “record information and relay possible threats,” but
may soon carry electric shock weapons and options such as
“weapons detection [and] facial recognition technology.”26 Police
involvement in traffic stops and traffic accidents may no longer be
necessary once self-driving cars are in use.27 In fact, self-driving
cars may cut down police work by transporting arrestees and even
“testing . . . for alcohol or drugs, scanning for weapons, conducting
records checks for outstanding warrants, reading the arrestee Miranda rights, and even arranging for defense attorneys, arraignments, and bail payments.”28 Most ticketing for traffic offenses can
likely be completed through cameras, license plate readers, and
automatic billing.29 And corporations are already exploring the pos21

Joh, supra note 17, at 146–48.

22

Joh, supra note 17, at 149–53.

23

Joh, supra note 17, at 159–60; 161–66.

24

Joh, supra note 17, at 136, 140–46.

25

Joh, supra note 17, at 138–39.

26

Joh, supra note 17, at 139.

27

Joh, supra note 17, at 141.

28

Joh, supra note 17, at 141, 142–43.

29

Joh, supra note 17, at 141–42.
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sibility of automating police paperwork through transcription from
police body cameras.30
Joh also points out that the very action of developing suspicion is
being taken over by predictive artificial intelligence, which lessens
both the number of people needed to find and analyze evidence and
the number of people the police need to interact with (as they focus
their attention on “hot spots”).31 Even the use of lethal force may be
automated eventually, as we are seeing in the military context.32
The positive aspects of this development, according to Joh,
include “lower crime rates, greater transparency through data gathering, and less unnecessary police violence,” as well as the possibility
of a shift in the doctrines of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause.33 But, she cautions, it will also almost surely result in “deskilling,” as police lose their ability to perform tasks that are increasingly
performed by machines instead.34 Moreover, police are likely to lose
employment opportunities,35 which is likely to result in hostile and
adversarial relations with police unions.36
Expanding on these ideas, Joh first turns to criminal procedure.
She recounts the history of the professionalization of policing, which
culminated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of (and deference to) police “expertise.”37 As Joh notes, a great deal of the broad
deference that is accorded to police in the areas of determining
probable cause and reasonable suspicion is based on the idea that
police have special training, experience, and knowledge due to their
profession.38 If suspicion is automated through algorithms that trawl
through social media and other connections to compile a list of
suspects, and police merely read that output, how can this claim of
expertise remain?39 This may be a significant and positive change
30

Joh, supra note 17, at 142.

31

Joh, supra note 17, at 143–45.

32

Joh, supra note 17, at 145.

33

Joh, supra note 17, at 147–48. Joh further explores the possibility of a sea
change in criminal procedure doctrine. Joh, supra note 17, at 149–51.
34

Joh, supra note 17, at 146–48.

35

Joh, supra note 17, at 149, 154, 157.

36

Joh, supra note 17, at 157.

37

Joh, supra note 17, at 149–50.

38

Joh, supra note 17, at 150–51. For philosophical and constitutional critiques
of the move toward predictive policing, see Jackson Polansky & Henry F. Fradella,
Does ‘Precrime’ Mesh with the Ideals of U.S. Justice? Implications for the Future of
Predictive Policing, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 253 (2017).
39

Joh, supra note 17, at 151.

1222

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 56 No. 6

FROM THE LEGAL LITERATURE
since, as Joh notes, the amount of deference accorded police has
been the subject of a great deal of criticism.40
Joh discusses the reorganization that might be expected to come
from police automation. She suggests that
small police agencies might rely heavily on automated systems while
retaining a core group of officers and administrators as systems
operators. The result would be very thinly staffed agencies . . . large
urban departments may also embrace replacing many of its people
with machines, but . . . [p]olice automation may increase the overall
policing presence in cities. When the activity of policing becomes
cheaper through technology, police presence may grow exponentially.41

This warning of exponential growth in police presence is the only
nod that Joh gives to the general U.S. dislike of the concept of a
surveillance state.
Joh also discusses the structural forces that are likely to lead to
this broad reorganization of police departments, based on innovations in technology.42 These structural forces include budgets and
the public responses to racial bias (creating the dynamic discussed
in the introduction to this review).43 But while Joh acknowledges that
a great deal of momentum in digital policing comes from a desire to
lessen opportunities for racial discrimination, her discussion of these
issues is momentary. 44 She focuses instead on the possible
repercussions of the digital surveillance state (as discussed below).
Along with the questions of general deskilling, as possible negatives Joh highlights the ethical implications of the impending use of
lethal force by machines.45 She briefly refers to the moral considerations, and general incomprehensibility, of allowing lethal decisions
to be made by machines.46 This issue may be rectified, she suggests, by keeping a human decisionmaker “in the loop.”47 She notes,
however, that even this may not fix the problem, as the military
experience shows humans have become deskilled, “increasingly
dependent on . . . machines . . . lack[ing] the ability to perceive all
the factors the machine observes, react as quickly as a machine
does, or even determine whether an error is being made.”48
Finally, Joh turns to the issues highlighted by the Camden
40

Joh, supra note 17, at 150.

41

Joh, supra note 17, at 157.

42

Joh, supra note 17, at 155–60.

43

Joh, supra note 17, at 155.

44

Joh, supra note 17, at 149, 155.

45

Joh, supra note 17, at 145, 152–54, 156–57.

46

Joh, supra note 17, at 156.

47

Joh, supra note 17, at 156.

48

Joh, supra note 17, at 156–57.
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example, which she refers to as “desocialization of the police.”49
When such a large portion of policing is overtaken by automation,
the police lose the opportunity to engage in community policing,
because police-public contacts decrease.50 Losing these interactions
may also result in a decrease in police legitimacy, and sanctions that
stem from machine decisions may be looked at suspiciously, as they
can be difficult to understand or debate with.51 For all these reasons,
Joh warns us to be careful about automating police work.
III. CONCLUSION
Joh offers a useful window into the ongoing process of automation
of policing, its causes, and several of its risks and benefits. She
does not, however, directly engage with some of the larger positives
and negatives of the process—such as the legitimate interest in
reducing police contact in overly policed areas, and the larger aversion to overwhelming surveillance. Hopefully, as the debate surrounding the future of policing continues, this issue will also be carried into the broader realm of legal scholarship, so that these vital
concerns can be explored and considered before the process of
automation takes off on its own.
49

Joh, supra note 17, at 159.

50

Joh, supra note 17, at 161–62.

51

Joh, supra note 17, at 162–63.
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